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7KLV DUWLFOH VWXGLHV WKH HIIHFWV RQ DFFRXQWLQJ SHUIRUPDQFH DQGÀQDQFLQJ
GHFLVLRQVRI&RORPELDQÀUPVDIWHULVVXLQJDFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFHFRGH:H
assemble a database of Colombian issuers and test the hypotheses of improved 
performance and higher leverage after issuing a code. The results show that 
WKHÀUPV·UHWXUQRQDVVHWVDIWHUWKHFRGHLQWURGXFWLRQLPSURYHVLQH[FHVVRI
WKHHIIHFWLVDPSOLÀHGE\WKHFRGHTXDOLW\$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHÀUPVOHYHUDJH
increased, in excess of 5%, when the code quality was factored into the analysis. 
These results suggest that controlling parties commitment to self restrain, 
E\UHGXFLQJWKHLUSULYDWHEHQHÀWVDQGRUWKHH[SURSULDWLRQRIQRQFRQWUROOLQJ
parties, through the code introduction, is indeed an effective measure and 
WKDWWKHÀQDQFLDOPDUNHWVDJUHHLQFUHDVLQJWKHVXSSO\RIIXQGVWRWKHÀUPV
1  The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistant of Ewelina Makowska, Mauricio Arcos, Juan 
Manuel Chaves and Angela del Valle.
2  Este documento fue seleccionado en la convocatoria para enviar artículos, Call for Papers, realizada en 
el marco del Simposio “Análisis y propuestas creativas ante los retos del nuevo entorno empresarial”, 
organizado en el marco de celebración de los 30 años de la Facultad de Ciencias Administrativas y Eco-
QyPLFDVGHOD8QLYHUVLGDG,FHVL\GHORVDxRVGHVXUHYLVWDDFDGpPLFDEstudios Gerenciales, el 15 











Códigos de Gobierno en Colombia: 
¢UHDOLGDGRÀFFLyQ"
Este artículo estudia los efectos sobre 
el desempeño contable y sobre las 
GHFLVLRQHVÀQDQFLHUDV GH HPSUHVDV
colombianas después de implementar 
su código de gobierno. Los resultados 
muestran que el retorno sobre los 
activos de las empresas, luego de im-
plementado el código, mejora en más 
GHHOHIHFWRHVDPSOLÀFDGRSRUOD
calidad del código. Adicionalmente, se 
notó un incremento de más de un 5% 
en el apalancamiento de las empresas 
que habían incorporado un código. 
Estos resultados sugieren que el 
compromiso de las partes controladas 
para autorregularse, reduciendo sus 
EHQHÀFLRV SULYDGRV \R OD H[SURSLD-
ción de las partes no controladoras, a 
través de la introducción del código, 
es en realidad una medida efectiva y 
TXHORVPHUFDGRVÀQDQFLHURVDSR\DQ
incrementando el suministro de fon-
GRVDODVÀUPDV
PALABRAS CLAVE
Gobierno corporativo, códigos de go-
bierno, teoría de agencia, desempeño 
contable, apalancamiento. 
RESUMO
Códigos de Governança na Co-
O{PELDIDWRVRXÀFomR"
Este artigo estuda os efeitos sobre 
o desempenho contabilístico e sobre 
DVGHFLV}HVÀQDQFHLUDVGHHPSUHVDV
colombianas depois que emitiram seu 
SUySULRFyGLJRGHJRYHUQDQoD2VUH-
sultados mostram que o retorno sobre 
os ativos das empresas depois de emi-
tido o código melhora em mais de 1%; 
RHIHLWRpDPSOLÀFDGRSHODTXDOLGDGH
do código. Adicionalmente, após a 
introdução do código, a alavancagem 
das empresas se incrementa em mais 
de 5% quando a qualidade do código 
é incorporada na análise. Estes re-
sultados sugerem que o compromisso 
das partes em controle para se auto 
regular, reduzindo seus benefícios 
privados e/ou a expropriação das 
partes não controladoras, através da 
introdução do código, é na realidade 
XPDPHGLGDHÀFD]HTXHRVPHUFDGRV
ÀQDQFHLURVFRQFRUGDPDXPHQWDQGR
o fornecimento de fundos para em-
presas.
PALAVRAS CHAVE
Governo corporativo, códigos de go-




Firm governance codes are devices 
pushed by regulators in order to 
induce good EHKDYLRU E\ ÀUP FRQ-
trolling parties: by committing to 
UHGXFHWKHLUSULYDWHEHQHÀWVRUWKH
expropriation of fund suppliers, the 
controlling parties create a trusty 
HQYLURQPHQW WKDW HDVHV RXWVLGHÀ-
nancing, reducing the cost of capital 
and generating higher returns for 
all involved parties. The trend began 
with the Cadbury Report in 1992; 
their issuance followed a series of 
FRPSDQ\IDLOXUHVLQWKH8.OLNHO\
by poor governance practices. The 
report was produced by an ad hoc 




After this effort different countries 
and organizations have been fol-
lowing the trend, with exchanges 
and regulators around the world 
issuing analogous requirements or 
guidelines, product of the consen-
VXVRIH[SHUWV·SDQHOV%\WKH
European Corporate Governance 
,QVWLWXWH(&*,OLVWHGGLIIHUHQW
codes, guidelines and comparative 
studies from 63 countries and 6 
multi-country organizations. After 
the Cadbury Report, Canada issued 
The Toronto Report and South Africa 
issued the King ReportLQ,Q
1995 Australia disclosed the Bosch 
Report, France disclosed the Vienot 
ReportDQGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPWKH
Greenbury Report, this time on di-
UHFWRUV·UHPXQHUDWLRQ7KHKLJKHVW
peak came in 2002, with 33 studies 
and recommendations. 
Clearly the idea of self regulation 
has some appeal for the business 
community and regulators. Colom-
bia is not different in this sense, 
and the association of Chambers 
of Commerce (Confecamaras) pro-
GXFHGLQWKHÀUVEHVWSUDFWLFH
FRGH IRU SXEOLF ÀUPV 7KH&RORP-
bian regulator, Superintendencia 
de Valores (today Superintendencia 
Financiera), with the resolution 
275/2001 required that all firms 
with listed securities and that in-
tended to receive funds from pen-
sion funds produced a Governance 
Code. By November of 2003, ninety 
one issuers had adopted governance 
FRGHV,QWKH&RQJUHVVHQDFWHG
the Law of the Securities Market.3 
which established board guidelines 
IRUSXEOLFÀUPVDQGWKHFRQGLWLRQV
to be met by independent board 
members. Finally, in 2007 the Su-
perintendencia adopted a Country 
Governance Code, and demanded 
that issuers answered a Governance 
Survey about their compliance of the 
guidelines included in the Code. As 
many current requirements around 
WKHZRUOGDSDUWLFXODUÀUPVKRXOG
comply or explain why does not meet 
what the Code demands.
There is, however, little effort in 
these Guidelines or Codes to link 
WKHRUHWLFDO MXVWLÀFDWLRQV WR DFWXDO
recommendations. A broad picture 
of the reasons behind the Codes be-
JLQVZLWKWKH$JHQF\7KHRU\8QGHU
the premises of this theory, oppor-
tunistic agents can take advantage 





are affected by uncertainty. Three 
GLIIHUHQWSDUWLHVFDQEHLGHQWLÀHGDW
the top of any organization: 1) man-
agement, who should act in behalf of 
all owners and respond to the board; 
but they can act opportunistically, 
expropriating shareholders; 2) large, 
sometimes controlling, sharehold-
ers, who should act in behalf of 
themselves, but can expropriate mi-
nority shareholders; and 3) minority 
shareholders. An additional party is 
the product of a key mechanism of 
governance: the board of directors; 
board members are agents who act 
in behalf of all owners, and whose 
job is almost exclusively to deal 
with management, but their func-
tion is affected by the relationship 
with management, their private 
interests, and time constrains. 




rule of law (legal system and judi-
ciary) are not enough to avoid non 
optimal behavior by agents, busi-
ness associations and regulators 
alike have encouraged the adoption 
RI JRYHUQDQFH JXLGHOLQHV ,Q RUGHU
to induce good behavior by agents 
(managers, board members, and 
controlling shareholders), contracts, 
implicit and explicit, should be well 
designed and controlled, especially 
because management can expro-
priate shareholders due to their 
advantage in information and their 
control of daily and major decisions. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) analyze the 
problem and posit that in complex 
organizations is optimal to allo-
cate the different steps involved in 
decision making between manage-
ment and the board of directors. 
Management should be in charge of 
proposing and implementing deci-
sions, while the board of directors 
should be in charge of the approval 
DQGPRQLWRULQJRIGHFLVLRQV%RDUG·V
effectiveness can suffer if manage-
ment forces. Not surprisingly, all 
governance guidelines include rules 
related to the operation and struc-
ture of the board of directors. 
7KHHIÀFLHQWRSHUDWLRQRIWKHERDUG
DGGUHVVHVWKHWKUHHDJHQF\FRQÁLFWV
mentioned above, but outsiders, 
funds providers, also might be hurt 
by informational disadvantages. To 
alleviate asymmetric information 
problems, the codes usually require 
HQRXJK GLVFORVXUH RI ÀQDQFLDO DQG
operational data to give to stake-
holders, and to the market in gen-
eral, a precise idea of the current 
and prospective situation of the 
ÀUP$GGLWLRQDOO\GHDOLQJVDQGFRQ-
tracts involving senior management 
and directors regarding payment (at 
least the structure of the incentive 
packages), share purchases/sales, 
RSHUDWLRQVZLWKWKHÀUPDQGRWKHU
SRWHQWLDO FRQÁLFW RI LQWHUHVWV DUH
commonly required to disclose. The 
VHOIUHJXODWLRQRIÀUPVLVEDVHGRQ
the idea that transparent manage-
PHQWDQGDUP·VOHQJWKUHODWLRQVKLSV
with controlling groups induce the 
WUXVWRIRXWVLGHLQYHVWRUVLQWKHÀUP
As a consequence, outside investors, 
shareholders and creditors are will-
ing to provide more funds at lower 
costs. Additionally, trust reduces 
PRQLWRULQJFRVWVPDNLQJWKHÀUP·V
RSHUDWLRQVPRUH HIILFLHQW ,I WKH
EHQHÀWVRIDODUJHUVL]HORZHUFRVW
of capital, better risk allocation and 
reduced monitoring outweighs the 
UHGXFWLRQLQSULYDWHEHQHÀWVE\WKH
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controlling parties, then governance 
codes are effective. 
The tests in this research document 
an increase in accounting perfor-
mance for the Colombian firms 
that issue a governance code, which 
also sheds light about the causality 
EHWZHHQ JRYHUQDQFH DQG ÀQDQFLDO
results. Given that a positive as-
sociation between performance and 
governance levels, does not answer 
if good governance produces better 
results or if good results induce bet-
ter governance; the approach we use 
permit us to tackle this important 
LVVXH7KHFRHIÀFLHQWVLQRXUHTXD-
tions show that improvements in 
performance and increased lever-
age occur after an event associated 
to better practices. We document 
an increase of 1,53% in return on 
DVVHWV DIWHU WKH ÀUPV LVVXH WKHLU
governance code and controlling 
SHUWKHFRXQWU\·V*'37KHHIIHFWLV
also associated to the code quality, 
ÀUPV LVVXLQJ EHWWHUZULWWHQ FRGHV
have higher increments in return 
RQ DVVHWV 2XU UHVXOWV VKRZ WKDW
return on performance increases by 
IRUÀUPVZLWKJRRGFRGHV$V
stated before an additional positive 
consequence of the governance codes 
is debt access. After issuing a well 
ZULWWHQ JRYHUQDQFH FRGH D ÀUP LV
able to increase its leverage; an in-
FUHDVHRILQÀQDQFLDOOHYHUDJH
LVIRXQGIRUÀUPVZLWKJRRGFRGHV
The results seem to support the ef-
fectiveness of self regulation as a 
mean to induce optimal behavior by 
controlling parties. The outcome is, 
hopefully, an improved equilibrium 
ZKHUH ÀUPV JURZ IDVWHU EHFDXVH
funds providers, perceiving less risk, 
are willing to reduce their required 
returns and/or increase their supply 
RIIXQGVWRWKHÀUPV
The article is organized as follows: 
after this introductory section; sec-
tion one surveys related papers; 
section two analyzes the structure 
of governance codes, following the 
JXLGHOLQHVGHYHORSHGE\WKH2(&'
section three presents the data and 
the relevant tests; and section four 
concludes. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
A large body of research explores 
the links between governance and 
SHUIRUPDQFH .ODSSHU DQG /RYH
(2004) use a governance score for 
HPHUJLQJPDUNHWVÀUPVDQGUHSRUW
WKDWÀUPVZLWKKLJKHUVFRUHVKDYH
better operating performance and 
market valuation for the year 2002. 




more dividends. Garay, González, 
González, and Hernández (2006) 
also built a governance index and 
ÀQGWKDW9HQH]XHODQÀUPVZLWKKLJK
scores were more valuable and paid 
more dividends in 2002. Gruszczyn-
ski (2006) reports that independent 
corporate ratings assigned by the 
Polish Corporate Governance Forum 
ZHUH DVVRFLDWHGZLWKKLJKHU SURÀW
margins and lower debt levels for 
WKHODUJHVWOLVWHG3ROLVKÀUPV
Padgett and Shabbir (2005) study 
WKHFRGHFRPSOLDQFHIRU8.ÀUPV
in the FTSE 350 for the years 
DQGDQGÀQGWKDW7RWDO
Shareholder Return (capital gains 
and dividend yield) is associated 
with higher levels of compliance, 
additionally they report that cau-
+SZIVRERGIGSHIWJEGXWSV½GXMSRW#%WXYH]SJKSZIVRERGIGSHIWMRCSPSQFME
 ESTUDIOSGERENCIALES :SP2S3GXYFVI(MGMIQFVIHI
sation runs from governance to 
performance, addressing the issue 
that corporate governance produces 
EHWWHUÀUPUHVXOWVZKLFKLVVLPLODU
WRZKDWZH ÀQG LQ RXU WHVWV FRGH
compliance is based in reports that 
ÀUPVVHQGWRWKHUHJXODWRULQWKLV
PRGHLQVWHDGRIÀUPVZULWLQJWKHLU
governance codes, the regulator de-
ÀQHVZKDW D VWDQGDUG JRYHUQDQFH
FRGHVKRXOGLQFOXGHDQGÀUPVUHSRUW
what recommendations they meet 
and what they don´t, explaining why 
they do not comply the standard. 
,Q WKH1HWKHUODQGVD VWXG\E\GH
Jong, DeJong, Mertens, and Wesley 
FRPSDULQJÀUPPHDVXUHVSUH
and post Peters Report (Netherlands 
Governance Guidelines) found little 
evidence of a positive impact of the 
Peters Report in the performance 
RI'XWFKÀUPVKRZHYHUWKH\IRXQG
that limits on shareholder rights 
WHQG WR SURGXFH ORZHU 7RELQ·V T
DQGWKDWWKHOHYHOVRI7RELQ·VTDQG
growth were statistically higher in 
the post-Peter era, at that time (cir-
ca 1997) there was not a comply or 
explain requirement. Price, Roman, 
DQG5RXQWUHHGLGQRWÀQGHI-
fects of governance compliance for 
OLVWHG0H[LFDQÀUPVIROORZLQJWKH
enactment of the Voluntary Code in 
2003, even after a period of increas-
ing compliance. 
Pombo and Gutierrez (2007) do not 
find significant determinants of 
governance quality, except for the 
code existence and the stock liquid-
LW\IRU&RORPELDQÀUPVIRUWKHSH-
ULRGEHWZHHQDQG8VLQJ
information from 2005, Langebaek 
DQG2UWL]EXLOWDJRYHUQDQFH
LQGH[IRU&RORPELDQOLVWHGÀUPVEXW
WKH\ GLG QRW ÀQG DQ\ DVVRFLDWLRQ
EHWZHHQ WKLV LQGH[ DQG WKH ÀUPV
7RELQ·V T KRZHYHU JLYHQ WKH ORZ
liquidity of most of Colombian 
shares, this lack of association is 
not surprising. 




ZDVRQHRI WKHÀUVW LQVWLWXWLRQV WR
issue governance guidelines and 
became an important reference 
for subsequent efforts. The guide-
lines cover the following topics: 
1) Shareholders rights, 2) Equi-
table treatment of shareholders, 3) 
Stakeholders role, 4) Disclosure and 
transparency, and 5) Responsibili-
ties of the board.
 6KDUHKROGHUV ULJKWV DFFRUGLQJ
to the guidelines, the governance 
framework should protect the 
H[HUFLVHRIVKDUHKROGHU·VULJKWV
providing mechanisms to facili-
tate informed participation and 
voting in all relevant company 
decisions for all shareholders. 
Transactions including changes 
in control will be completely dis-
closed, and fair priced, allowing 
for all sharehold-ers to express 
their concerns and those concerns 
should be properly addressed. At 
no time measures to shield man-
agement from accountability will 
be in place. 
 (TXLWDEOH WUHDWPHQW RI VKDUH-
KROGHUV VSHFLÀF UXOHV IRU DYRL-
ding actions that expropriate spe-
FLÀF JURXSV RI VKDUHKROGHUV DUH
also required by the guidelines, 
those rules include provisions to 
ease voting procedures, disclo-
sure of any material interest by 
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board members or management 
in any transaction that affect 
WKHÀUPDQGHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRI
redress by affected shareholders. 
 The role of stakeholders: the 
rights of stakeholders recognized 
by law or through mutual agree-
ments should be respected and 
recognized, promoting active co-
operation among the stakehold-
ers and the company to foster 
value creation, those stakehold-
ers include, but are not limited 
to, employees and creditors. 
 'LVFORVXUHDQGWUDQVSDUHQF\LQ
terms of disclosure and transpar-
ency, the guidelines recommend 
that all material information re-
JDUGLQJWKHÀUPPXVWEHWLPHO\
and properly disclosed. 
 7KHERDUGRIGLUHFWRUVUHVSRQVL-
bilities of the board include the 
VWUDWHJLF JXLGDQFH RI WKH ÀUP
monitoring of management, the 
ERDUG·V DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR WKH
company and shareholders, and 
ensuring a fair treatment of all 
shareholders when its decisions 
affect them differently. The board 
also selects top management, 
DQGGHÀQHVWKHLUFRPSHQVDWLRQ
making sure that incentives are 
properly designed to align the 
interests of management and all 
shareholders.
Studying the different codes issued 
E\WKH&RORPELDQÀUPVZHFDPHXS
with a set of thirty six questions, 
related to the topics included in the 
guidelines and regarding if a par-
ticular code includes a section cover-
LQJHDFKTXHVWLRQ·VVSHFLÀFLVVXH7R
rate the codes we award one point 
per each question the code includes 
and normalize the rating dividing by 
WKHWRWDOQXPEHURITXHVWLRQV,Q$S-
pendix 1 we show the questions we 
study and to which topic are related. 
3. DATA SET AND TESTS
2XUÀQDQFLDOGDWDLVIURPÀUPVZKR
issues securities, bonds and shares, 
which are traded in the Colombian 
([FKDQJH7KRVHÀUPVUHSRUWWKHLU
ÀQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ WR WKH ORFDO
regulator, Superintendencia Finan-
ciera, which makes that information 
available through its website. From 
that information we assemble an 
XQEDODQFHGSDQHORIÀUPVZLWK
 ÀUP\HDU REVHUYDWLRQV IURP
 WR  H[FOXGLQJ ÀQDQFLDO
ÀUPV EXW NHHSLQJKROGLQJ FRPSD-
nies.4 The code requirement was 
LQWURGXFHG LQ IRUDÀUPZLWK
ten years of data, who introduced 
LWV FRGH LQ ZH KDYH ÀYH SUH
and post code years of financial 
information. From 2001 until the 
HQGRIRXUVWXG\SHULRGÀUPV
LQFOXGLQJÀQDQFLDOÀUPVKDGLVVXHG
their governance codes. Excluding 
ÀQDQFLDO ÀUPV DQG ÀUPVZLWKRXW
HQRXJK ÀQDQFLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ ZH
HQG XSZLWK  ÀUPV SURGXFLQJ D
Governance Code (Appendix 2) and 
 ÀUP\HDU REVHUYDWLRQVZKLFK
we analyze. The results of Hausman 
tests to choose between a random 
RUÀ[HGHIIHFWVDSSURDFKIDYRUVWKH
random effect approach (see Table 
3, panel A, regression 4; and Table 








accounting performance, return on 
assets and return on equity; two 
alternative measures of leverage, 
WRWDODQGÀQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHDQGIRXU
control variables including proxies for 
size (the log of sales in Colombian pe-
VRV&23PLOOLRQVPDUNHWSRZHU
DVVHWV· WDQJLELOLW\ DQG WKH RYHUDOO
economic situation. The governance 
related variables include a dummy 
for the code existence, the code rating, 
and an interaction variable for both. 
The code dummy takes the value 
of one after the code is issued, zero 
otherwise. 
Table 2 reports the statistics of our 
data. The correlations among our 
measures of performance and the 
code rating are positive, similar to 
ZKDW KDSSHQVZLWK WKH*'32XU
regressions intend to uncover if the 
code rating has a positive impact on 
performance besides the GDP; the 
correlation between the code rating 
and the GDP is almost zero, as ex-





ROA Net income on assets
ROE Net income on book equity
  
Leverage  
Financial leverage Total debt on total assets
Total leverage Total liabilities on total assets
  
Control  
Size Log of sales (COP$ millions)
Tangibles Tangible assets on total assets
Sales margin Net income on sales
GDP Colombian GDP COP$ (Billions)
Total assets growth Increase in total assets on total assets(t-1), inﬂation adjusted 
Sales growth Increase in sales on sales(t-1), inﬂation adjusted
  
Governance variables
Code dummy 1 in case of code existence, 0 otherwise




The structure of our tests sheds 
light on the relationship between 
governance codes and accounting per-
IRUPDQFH:HDOVRWHVWLIÀUPVZLWK
governance codes have more access 
to external funds, particularly debt, 
after they issue a governance code. 
2XUK\SRWKHVHVDUHDVIROORZV
H1. Performance improves after 
the issuance of a governance code.
2XU UDWLRQDOHZDV H[SODLQHGSUHYL-
ously. By a credible self committing 
of management and controlling share-
holders to a non extracting behavior, 
fund providers are willing to reduce 
their expected return, lowering the 
ÀUP·VFRVWRIFDSLtal. As a consequence 
Panel B. Correlations









ROE 76,35%         
Fin.  
Leverage -30,14% -20,73%        
Total  
leverage -29,94% -27,03% 69,75%       
Size 2,09% -1,31% -4,37% 11,16%      
Tangibles -18,75% -6,41% 19,92% 17,45% 5,89%     
Sales  
margin 62,41% 40,62% -28,63% -36,02% 1,98% -18,57%    
Code  
dummy 20,71% 16,97% 6,70% 11,95% -0,18% -1,84% 9,54%   
Code  
rating 33,23% 23,66% -5,58% -12,11% 9,51% -13,26% 28,97% -6,29%  
GDP 31,38% 22,24% -3,67% -1,94% 8,72% -7,43% 24,03% 76,69% 2,83%
1RWH9DULDEOHVDUHGHÀQHGLQ7DEOH&RUUHODWLRQVEDVHGRQREVHUYDWLRQV
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 325 1,65% 6,25% -24,20% 21,97%
ROE 325 1,11% 16,42% -163,97% 53,67%
Fin. Leverage 325 20,04% 15,65% 0,00% 62,80%
Total leverage 325 37,24% 21,49% 0,02% 94,50%
Size 325 12,32 2,50 7,10 25,91 
Tangibles 325 22,10% 20,15% 0,00% 90,21%
Sales margin 325 6,66% 42,45% -399,55% 161,00%
Code dummy 325 48,31% 50,05% 0,00% 100,00%
Code rating 325 46,04% 12,12% 0,00% 65,85%
Table 2. Selected sample statistics




cause more positive NPV projects are 
carried away. Additionally, monitor-
ing costs are reduced, which also has a 
SRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQSURÀWDELOLW\:HJR
further and posit that improvements 
in performance are associated with 
the code quality, and then we have a 
related hypothesis:
H1a. The increment in perfor-
mance is associated with the code 
quality. 
2XU VHFRQG JURXS RI K\SRWKHVHV LV
UHODWHGZLWKWKHÀUP·VGHEWFDSDFLW\
*LYHQWKDWWKHÀUP·VULVNLVUHGXFHG
creditors are willing to provide more 
IXQGV WR WKHÀUPV7KHQ DIWHU WKH
FRGHLVVXDQFHWKHÀUPOHYHUDJHZLOO
be higher:
H2. Leverage increases after the 
issuance of a governance code.
6LPLODUO\WRRXUÀUVWK\SRWKHVLVZH
also posit that the increment in lever-
DJHZLOOEHKLJKHUIRUWKHÀUPZLWK
the better codes.
H2a. The increment in leverage 





structure two set of equations. The 
ÀUVWKDVDFFRXQWLQJSHUIRUPDQFHDV
the dependent variable, the second 
group has leverage. The equation for 
WKHÀUVWVHWLVDVIROORZV
                     (1)
7KHSHUIRUPDQFHYDULDEOHVDUH52$
RU52(ZKLOHWKHFRQWUROYDULDEOHV
are tangibility of assets, leverage, 
size, and sales margin. All the con-
trol variables are known to have 
an impact on performance. Firms 
with high tangible assets tend to 
characterize mature industries with 
low returns, so we expect a negative 
relationship with performance. Size 
is also a signal of lower risk, less 
variability of income, thus the rela-
tionship with performance should be 
negative. Leverage and performance 
are negatively related according to 
the pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984), but according to the 
IUHH FDVKÁRZDUJXPHQWE\-HQVHQ
(1986), the relationship can be posi-
tive, with managers working harder 
to meet debt service. Sales margin is 
positively related with performance, 
given that market power produces 
higher returns. The last control vari-
able is GDP, although the structure 
of our regressions measures the 
increase in performance after the 
code is introduced, is it possible that 
a spurious association appears if the 
sample years record better economic 
results. The control mechanisms we 
consider are the code dummy and 
the interaction between the code 
dummy and the code rating. We do 
not consider the code rating alone as 
mechanism of control, because our 
interest is, as said before, to assess 
if the code introduction and its qual-
LW\KDYHDSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQÀUP·V
performance. 
2XU UHVXOWV DUH UHSRUWHG LQ 7DEOH
3. Panel A regressions have an ex-
planatory power of 0,42 while panel 
B regressions have one of 0,21 which 
means that our stronger dependent 
YDULDEOHZLOO EH 52$ WKH UHVXOWV
WKDW IROORZ FRQÀUP LW 7KH FRQWURO
variables have the hypothesized signs 
Performanceit = _0 + _1MC1it  +
+ -  aj CV jit + ¡it42
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but just sales margin and leverage 
are statistically significant, with 
the leverage sign backing the peck-
LQJRUGHUH[SODQDWLRQ7KHÀUVWWZR
UHJUHVVLRQVRISDQHO$ZKHUH52$
is the dependent variable, show that 
the code dummy is still statistically 
VLJQLÀFDQWDIWHUFRQWUROOLQJSHU*'3
however, the effect is diminished in 
size, by 1,05% and in statistical power 
to 10%. Nevertheless, the increase 
LQ52$DIWHUWKHFRGHLVLQWURGXFHG
is 1,53%, which is a substantial gain 
IRUDQ\ÀUP:KHQZHVZLWFKWRWKH
interaction variable as control mecha-
nism, in regressions 3 and 4 of panel 
$ZHÀQGDVWURQJHUSLFWXUH7KHHI-
fect of the interaction variable, after 
Table 3. Accounting returns and governance codes
Dependent Variable A. ROA B. ROE
                                        Coef.(z)                Coef.(z)
Size -1,67E-04  -5,30E-04  -1,09E-04  -5,00E-04  -2,56E-03  -2,71E-03  
 (-0,16)  (-0,49)  (-0,10)  (-0,46)  (-0,73)  (-0,78)  
Tangibles -1,42E-02  -1,08E-02  -1,15E-02  -8,76E-03  4,42E-02  4,93E-02  
 (-0,66)  (-0,50)  (-0,53)  (-0,40)  (0,72)  (0,80)  
Code dummy 2,58E-02 *** 1,53E-02 *     4,22E-02    
  (5,29)   (1,95)       (1,64)    
Interaction dummy-rating     5,58E-02 *** 3,52E-02 **   7,15E-02  
      (5,42)   (2,29)     (1,43)  
GDP   1,14E-04 *   1,12E-04 * 1,37E-04  2,06E-04  
    (1,70)     (1,81)   (0,63)   (1,02)  
Sales margin 7,22E-02 *** 7,04E-02 *** 7,13E-02 *** 6,95E-02 *** 1,10E-01 *** 1,08E-01 ***
  (10,21)   (9,87)   (10,06)   (9,75)   (4,81)   (4,72)  
Total leverage -3,99E-02 ** -3,75E-02 ** -4,20E-02 ** -3,95E-02 ** -1,61E-01 *** -1,61E-01 ***
  (-2,37)   (-2,22)   (-2,48)   (-2,32)   (-3,11)   (-3,10)  
Constant 1,97E-02  2,52E-03  1,94E-02  2,60E-03  3,69E-02  2,75E-02  
  (1,27)   (0,14)   (1,25)   (0,14)   (0,63)   (0,48)  
Observations 325  325  325  325  325  325  
Firms 43  43  43  43  43  43  
Adj. R sq. 0,42  0,43  0,43  0,43  0,21  0,21  





p-values (*p< 0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01).
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controlling per GDP, is statistically 
VLJQLÀFDQWDWDQGWKHFRHIÀFLHQW
is 3,52%; for the average code this 
PHDQVDQLQFUHDVHLQ52$RI
(3,52%*46,04%), and an increase of 
  IRU WKHÀUP
with the best code. When we compare 
the effect of the code issuance and 
their quality (regressions 2 and 4) the 
size is almost the same for the aver-
DJH FRGHZKLOH WKH VL]H FRHIÀFLHQW
for the code issuance is 1,53%, the 
improvement for the average code 
is 1,62% (3,52%*46,04%). Taken to-
gether the results show an important 
DQGSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQ52$DIWHUWKH
ÀUPV LVVXH JRYHUQDQFH FRGHV 7KH
UHVXOWVGRQRWWUDQVODWHWR52(WKH
results in Panel B show that neither 
the code dummy nor the interaction 
YDULDEOHDUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQW
which means that improvements in 
performance of assets also accrue to 




The second group of regressions tests 
the association between leverage and 
the introduction of a governance code. 
The equation is as follows:
                    (2)
The control variables are size, tan-
gible assets, GDP, sales margin, and 
performance. Size and the level of 
tangible assets should have a positive 
effect on leverage, reducing the risk 
IRUFUHGLWRUVE\PRUHVWDEOHFDVKÁRZV
and because tangible assets are used 
as collateral for debts, respectively. 
*'3SURÀWDELOLW\DQGVDOHVPDUJLQ
should be negatively associated with 
OHYHUDJHEHFDXVHKLJKHUFDVKÁRZV
whatever the cause, reduce the need 
of external funds. The mechanisms of 
control are still the code dummy and 
the interaction variable.
2XU UHVXlts are reported in Table 
4. As robustness test we measure 
leverage in two ways, as total lever-
DJH DQG DV ÀQDQFLDO OHYHUDJH WKH
results are qualitatively similar with 
an explanatory power rounding the 
12%. Again all the control variables 
have the hypothesized sign, with 
VL]H ODFNLQJ VWDWLVWLFDO VLJQLÀFDQFH
LQDOOVSHFLÀFDWLRQVZKLOH*'3ODFNV
VWDWLVWLFDO VLJQLÀFDQFH LQ SDQHO $
VSHFLÀFDWLRQV 7KH FRQWUROPHFKD-
nism effect on leverage is absent 
when the variable is just the code 
dummy; however, when combined 
with the code quality in the interac-
tion variable, the expected result 
stands out. For total leverage the 
HIIHFW LV VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW DW
DQGWKHFRHIÀFLHQWVL]HLV
which means an increase in leverage 
of 3,69% (8,02%*46,04%) for the av-
erage code, while the improvement 
LVIRUWKHÀUP
with the best code. For financial 
leverage the coefficient is 7,03%, 
VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW DW  DQG
the increase in leverage for the aver-
age code is 3,23% (7,03%*46,04%), 
while the improvement is 4,63% 
 IRU WKH ÀUPZLWK
WKH EHVW FRGH ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR
note that creditors seem to take into 
account the code quality when ap-
SURYHDGGLWLRQDO IXQGV WRÀUPV ,Q
a market with scarcity of funds this 
advantage can be crucial to exploit 
investment opportunities, secur-
LQJWKHÀUPVZLWKJRRGJRYHUQDQFH
practices higher growth rates than 
its counterparties. 
Performanceit = _0 + _1MC1it  




LV WKH RSHUDWLRQDO LQÁXHQFH LQ WKH
introduction of a governance code. 
To study this issue we looked for 
relationships between sales growth 
and the governance code and its 
quality. Table 5 reports our find-
LQJV:HÀQG WKDW VDOHV JURZWK LV
SRVLWLYHO\LQÁXHQFHGE\LQYHVWPHQWV
(assets growth), leverage5 and GDP, 
as reported in regressions 1 and 3. 
 6LPLODUUHJUHVVLRQVXVLQJÀQDQFLDOOHYHUDJHSURGXFHVYLUWXDOO\WKHVDPHUHVXOWV
Table 4. Leverage and governance codes
Dependent variable A. Total leverage B. Financial leverage
                               Coef. (z)                            Coef. (z)
ROA -4,29E-01 *** -4,45E-01 *** -3,83E-01 *** -4,01E-01 ***
  (-2,65)   (-2,76)   (-2,98)   (-3,14)  
SIZE 7,64E-04  1,09E-03  9,21E-04  1,41E-03  
  (0,24)   (0,35)   (0,37)   (0,57)  
Tangibles 2,49E-01 *** 2,45E-01 ** 1,96E-01 *** 1,90E-01 ***
  (2,64)   (2,59)   (2,74)   (2,66)  
Code dummy 2,53E-02    1,58E-02    
  (1,12)     (0,88)    
Interaction dummy-rating   8,02E-02 *   7,03E-02 **
    (1,80)     (1,99)  
GDP -1,64E-04  -2,34E-04  -2,69E-04 * -3,71E-04 ***
  (-0,86)   (-1,32)   (-1,77)   (-2,63)  
Sales margin -6,48E-02 *** -6,35E-02 *** -5,07E-02 *** -4,97E-02 ***
  (-2,77)   (-2,73)   (-2,73)   (-2,69)  
Constant 3,42E-01 *** 3,49E-01 *** 2,15E-01 *** 2,25E-01 ***
  (5,98)   (6,18)   (4,84)   (5,16)  
Observations 325  325  325  325  
Firms 43  43  43  43  
Adj. R sq. 0,13  0,14  0,11  0,12  
Hausman       4,42  
The dependent variables are Total Leverage in panel A, and Financial Leverage in panel B. The 
table reports the results of Random Effects GLS unbalanced panel regressions. The data is from 
RISXEOLF&RORPELDQÀUPVFRYHULQJWHQ\HDUVÀYH\HDUVEHIRUHDQGDIWHUWKHFRGH
UHTXLUHPHQW9DULDEOHVDUHGHÀQHGLQ7DEOH=VWDWLVWLFVDUHUHSRUWHGEHWZHHQSDUHQWKHVHV
Asterisks are associated with p-values (*p< 0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01).
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However, the same regressions show 
DQHJDWLYHDQGVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀ-
cant impact of the presence of a gov-
HUQDQFHFRGHWKHLPSDFWLVPDJQLÀHG
by the quality of the governance code. 
Firms reduce their sales growth in 9% 
after issuing a governance code, and 
WKHÀUPZLWKWKHKLJKHVWTXDOLW\FRGH
UHGXFHVLWVVDOHVJURZWKLQ2XU
results point out that the improve-
ments in performance prompted by 
the codes are the result of operational 
improvements, rather than changes 
in sales. Finally, regressions 2 and 
Table 5. Growth and governance codes
Dependent variable Sales growth
 Coef. (z)
Total Assets Growth (TAG) 0,212 *** 0,070  0,214 *** 0,079  
  (2,87)   (0,68)   (2,91)   (0,76)  
Total leverage 0,316 *** 0,318 *** 0,336 *** 0,355 ***
  (3,80)   (3,77)   (3,95)   (4,11)  
ROA 0,001  0,064  0,095  0,209  
  -   (0,20)   (0,28)   (0,62)  
Size 0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  
  (-0,29)   (-0,27)   (-0,28)   (-0,22)  
Tangibles 0,210 *** 0,201 ** 0,204 *** 0,187 **
  (2,69)   (2,51)   (2,62)   (2,35)  
Code dummy -0,089 * -0,118 **     
  (-1,93)   (-2,47)      
Interaction dummy-rating     -0,193 ** -0,262 ***
      (-2,08)   (-2,64)  
GDP 0,901 ** 1,052 *** 0,848 ** 0,981 ***
  (2,28)   (2,64)   (2,35)   (2,69)  
Sales margin 0,074  0,039  0,077  0,046  
  (1,03)   (0,53)   (1,09)   (0,63)  
Interaction TAG-Dummy   0,288 **     
    (1,98)      
Interaction TAG-INTDR       0,572 *
        (1,90)  
Constant -0,278 *** -0,296 *** -0,274 *** -0,294 ***
  (-3,42)   (-3,65)   (-3,53)   (-3,76)  
Observations 203  203  203  203  
Firms 31  31  31  31  





(*p< 0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01).
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4 in Table 5 introduce an interac-
tion term between investments and 
the governance codes. The effect of 
WKLVQHZYDULDEOHLVWZRIROGÀUVWLW
UHGXFHV WKH VWDWLVWLFDO VLJQLÀFDQFH
of investments, but, second, the 
new interaction term is positive and 
VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW2XU UHVXOW
can be interpreted as an additional 
positive effect of the codes; after the 
code introduction (also weighed by 
its quality) capital investments are 
more effectively channeled into sales 
growth.
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the lack of liquidity of most of 
the shares of the stock issuers in our 
VDPSOHZHFRXOGQ·WVWXG\WKHHIIHFW
RQ WKH ILUP·VPDUNHW YDOXH RI WKH
governance code issuance; we instead 
study the accounting performance. 
Accounting measures respond to 
fundamental changes in a slower 
pace than market measures, making 
GLIÀFXOW WRGLVHQWDQJOH WKHHIIHFW RI
external shocks or events. To the best 
of our knowledge we tried to include 
all the relevant control variables 
that can also affect performance, we 
ZHUHDEOHWRÀQGDSRVLWLYHLPSDFWRQ
return on assets and higher leverage.
$SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ52$DQG WKH
possibility of secure additional debt 
funds in a traditionally restricted 
market is not, by any means, a 
small byproduct of the issuance of 
a governance code with good qual-
LW\,WVKRZVWKDWHIIRUWVWRLPSURYH
governance practices translate to the 
ÀUPÀQDQFHV2XUDUWLFOHH[SORLWVD
unique window of opportunity, when 
firms were free to structure their 
codes in any way they wanted; before 
the issuance of the country code and 
the requirement of adherence to the 
country code. Although good codes 
could be the result of hiring the 
right consultants, we think that our 
results show that a strong commit-
ment to better levels of governance, 
produces better codes and, as our 
article documents, better economic 
results. We also show that the rela-
tionship between sales growth and 
investments is positively mediated by 
the presence of governance codes. Dif-
ferent articles have documented the 
positive association between gover-
nance levels and performance, some 
of them built their own performance 
measures, some use self declared code 
compliance, but most look for simul-
taneous associations; our approach 
is to rate the governance code at its 
inception and link it to improvements 
in performance after its introduc-
WLRQVROYLQJWKHFDXVDOLW\LVVXH2XU
article supports the argument that 
better government practices increase 
ÀQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFHDQGWKDWFUHG-
ible commitments are valued by 
fund providers. We leave to further 
research the impact of governance 
FRGHVLQWKHÀUPSD\RXWDQGLWVFRVW
of capital, as additional positive con-
sequences of better practices.
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# Topic 1 Topic 2 Question
1 5 4 The code speciﬁes that code compliance is a board’s duty
2 5 4 Designation of, and incentive and payment policies for management, including 
their main duties, are included
3 5 4 Ethic standards, sanctions and conﬂict resolution guidelines
4 5 4 Designation of, and incentive and payment policies for the board, including their 
main duties, are included
5 5 4 Board’s Financial committee, explicit rules to disclose ﬁnancial statements
6 5 4 Substitute directors attend regular board meetings
7 5 4 Policies for Board meetings minutes and other relevant meeting are required
9 5  Election, functions, composition and independence of board are explicitly descri-
bed
8 5  Management is monitored and evaluated, board is evaluated
10 5  Board’s risk committee: losses control, audit, credit standards, purchases
11 5  Business opportunities should be evaluated by the board
12 5  Board members should receive induction training and instruction in board respon-
sibilities
13 4 5 Procedures for selection and remuneration of independent external and internal 
auditors
14 4 5 Explicit prohibitions for management and directors
15 4 2 Explicit clauses regarding the use of privileged information by external auditors, 
shareholders and investors
16 4 2 Shareholders’ relationships with ﬁrm are disclosed
17 4  Interest conﬂicts are prevented, managed and disclosed for controlling sharehold-
ers, minority shareholders, directors, and managers
18 4  Risk management map, including issuer risks for investors or their representatives
19 4  Policies for information transparency, including auditor election
20 4  Financial relationship among the issuer, controlling shareholders, managers, board 
members are fully disclosed
21 4  All dealings regarding ﬁrm securities trading for managers and board members are 
fully disclosed
22 4  Criteria, policies and procedures for information transparency and disclosure are 
explicit
23 4  Identity of main shareholders is disclosed
24 4  Rules for code web disclosure are included
25 4  The Firm and its subsidiaries, with all major shareholders are properly identiﬁed
26 4  External control and audit system are properly disclosed
27 4  Internal audit system is properly disclosed
28 2 1 Ultimate ownership is disclosed
29 2 1 Rules for the disclosure and circulation of investors and shareholders’ rights and 
duties are included
30 2 1 Policies for share repurchases is explicit
31 2  Internal control system policies inform shareholders and investors of relevant 
ﬁndings and allow their follow up
32 2  Equitable treatment of all shareholders and investors is explicit
33 2  Rules for calling general and extraordinary meetings, or general assemblies by 
minority shareholders are included
34 3  Rules about main suppliers are included
35 3  Social responsibility is explicit




Appendix 2. Firms included in the sample 
No. Firm
1 Abonos Colombianos S.A. 
2 Adminver S.A. 
3 Almacenes Éxito S.A.
4 Arcesa S.A. 
5 Bavaria S.A. 
6 Bioﬁlm S.A. 
7 Caracol Televisión S.A.
8 Cartón de Colombia S.A. 
9 Carulla Vivero S.A. 
10 Cementos Argos S.A. 
11 Cementos del Valle S.A.
12 Cementos Paz del Rio S.A. 
13 Compañía Colombiana de Cerámica S.A. 
14 C. Sur. de Arrendamiento Operativo S.A.
15 Coomeva Entidad Promotora de Salud S.A. 
16 Edatel S.A. e.s.p. 
17 Electroporcelana Gamma S.A. 
18 Enka de Colombia S.A. 
19 Filmtex S.A. 
20 Gaseosas Posada Tobon S.A. 
21 Generar S.A. e.s.p. 
22 Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores S.A. 
23 Ingenio Central Castilla S.A. 
24 Ingenio la Cabaña S.A. 
25 Ingenio Riopaila S.A.
26 Inveraval S.A.
27 Inversiones Argos S.A. 
28 Inversiones Nacional de Chocolates S.A. 
29 Locería Colombiana S.A. 
30 Mineros S.A. 
31 Organización de Ingeniería Internacional S.A.
32 Plastiquimica S.A. 
33 Polipropileno del Caribe S.A. 
34 Portafolio de Inversiones Suramericana S.A.
35 Promigas S.A. e.s.p. 
36 RCN Televisión S.A. 
37 Setas Colombianas S.A.
38 Sociedades Bolívar S.A. 
39 Suministros de Colombia S.A. 
40 Suramericana de Inversiones S.A. 
41 Telefónica Móviles Colombia S.A. 
42 Textiles Fabricato Tejicondor S.A. 
43 Valorem S.A. 
